There is a hybrid war going on, a cowardly war. Hybrid wars in the modern information space

15:03 23.03.2016 Andrew Korybko, political commentator, USA

The analytical portal Oriental Review is pleased to announce the start of regular publication of Andrew Korybko’s latest research on the topic “Hybrid Wars”. In planned publications, the author will highlight the strategies he described in hisbook,published last year. In his work, Andrew formulated a new paradigm for understanding the system of international relations and developed an appropriate methodology for testing his theoretical calculations.
In this publication, entitled "The Law of Cold War Waging," the author notes that:

« G The main hidden goal of any hybrid war is to prevent the construction of a multipolar system of international relations by externally provoking identity conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, political, etc.) in a transitional target state.” . The goals of the American strategy of “hybrid wars” are the integration projects of Russia and China (the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road)., which is the reason for a number of “geographical battles”. Andrew examines the situation in the following regions: the Eurasian Heartland, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America; its task is to identify the “pain points” of each respective transition state that can be exploited within the framework of a revolutionary form of warfare called “hybrid warfare”. Andrew's unique methodology includes variables such as ethnicity, religion, history, administrative boundaries, physical geography, as well as socio-economic imbalances within states; Such a multifaceted nature of the proposed methodology allows for a comprehensive analysis of the vulnerable “points” of all countries from the perspective of the doctrine of “hybrid wars”. The purpose of the author's scientific work and series of publications on our portal is to demonstrate possible scenarios that the United States may resort to to destabilize target states, and to warn decision-makers as well as the public so that they can better prepare for the likely scenarios when such scenarios begin be put into practice.

The Law of Hybrid Warfare

"Hybrid War" - This is the most significant development of the United States in the entire history of its existence: non-conventional (“hybrid”) forms of warfare (modified “color revolutions”) as the main tendency to destabilize states will be dominant for many decades to come. For those readers who are not accustomed to looking at geopolitics through the lens of “hybrid wars,” it may be difficult to determine where the next “hybrid war” will break out, but in reality, determining which regions or countries are most likely to fall victim to this new technology is not so difficult . The key to predicting the emergence of a “hybrid war” is the recognition that “hybrid wars are asymmetric conflicts provoked from outside, designed to undermine the integrity of geo-economic interests”; Based on this fact, it is relatively easy to indicate the direction of the likely impact. Andrew Korybko's series of publications opens with material that explains planning models for "hybrid wars" and also deepens readers' knowledge of the strategic contours of "hybrid wars." In subsequent materials, Andrew will demonstrate how “hybrid war” scenarios were implemented in the framework of the wars launched by the United States in Syria and Ukraine - two of the first victims of the “hybrid war” concept. In subsequent publications, the author will note what lessons have already been learned from the “hybrid wars” in Syria and Ukraine, and will also point out the new probable victims of “hybrid wars”, and what are the main geopolitical, strategic and socio-political risks of the “new victims” may face if American postmodern warfare technology is used against them.

Simulation of "hybrid warfare"

The first thing to know about “hybrid wars” is that they have never been fought against any of the US allies or in countries/regions where the US has infrastructure interests. The chaotic processes that begin after the deployment of a regime change scenario cannot be completely controlled; this fact can also have the opposite effect: the geopolitical blow that the United States directly or indirectly directs at its rivals in a multipolar world can be inflicted on them themselves. This is why the United States will never try to organize a “hybrid war” in a country/region where its interests are systemic, although, of course, such attempts may be likely and happen very quickly, depending on the geopolitical situation. However, the general rule is still that the US will not deliberately jeopardize its own interests unless a major US retreat would result in a scorched earth effect (presumably what could happen in Saudi Arabia if the US ever... Someday they will be forced out of the Middle East).

Geostrategic and geoeconomic determinants:

Before considering the geo-economic reasons for “hybrid wars”, it is important to note that the United States also pursues geostrategic goals, for example, luring Russia into a trap prepared for it, from which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to escape. We call such a trap the “Brzezinski U-Turn”: simultaneous strikes in Eastern Europe through the Donbass, in the Caucasus through Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Central Asia through the Fergana Valley; If a synchronized effect is achieved, this triple blow can have a catastrophic effect and literally paralyze the “Russian bear.” Such a scheme, in the best traditions of Machiavellianism, will always be present as a threat, since it is based on irrefutable geopolitical realities, and the best that Moscow can do is to try to prevent this big fire in its post-Soviet periphery or to quickly/properly respond to the said crises unleashed Washington, immediately at the moment of their occurrence. Thus, the geostrategic elements of a “hybrid war” inextricably follow along with the geo-economic ones, especially in the case of Russia, however, if we consider the concept of “hybrid wars” in a broader application, for example, against China and Iran, the “Brzezinski Turn” stratagem described above must be excluded , focusing, rather, on economic factors, which will be different for each specified goal.

The main hidden goal of any hybrid war is to prevent the construction of a multipolar system of international relations by externally provoking identity conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, political, etc.) in a transitional target state. This scenario is observed in Syria and Ukraine and is The law of hybrid warfare. The specific tactics and political technologies used in each individual case may differ, but the strategic concept remains unchanged and standard. With the end goal in mind, it becomes possible to move from theoretical considerations to analysis of practical implementation, and begin by tracing the geographic roots of the various projects that the United States intends to implement. Multipolar transnational projects against which “hybrid wars” can be launched can be of an energy, institutional or economic nature, and the more they intersect, the greater the likelihood of using a “hybrid war” strategy against them.

Socio-political structural risks and weaknesses:

Once the United States has identified a target state, it begins to look for its structural risks and weaknesses that can be exploited in the upcoming “hybrid war.” Note that these are not physical objects on which sabotage can be organized, such as power plants or roads (although these objects are also taken into account, but by other destabilization specialists), but socio-political phenomena that must be manipulated in order to accurately emphasize the “separatism” of a certain part of the population from the general fabric of the state and, thus, “legitimize” the subsequent externally inspired rebellion against the authorities. The following are the most common socio-political structural risks and weaknesses relevant to the preparation of a “hybrid war”; Moreover, each of these elements can be tied to a specific geographical area, after which they are likely to act as catalysts in the preparation of the “color revolution”, as well as as initial springboard territories for the subsequent transition to waging unconventional war. Socio-political and structural risks include:

* Ethnicity;

* Religion;

* Story;

* Administrative boundaries;

* Socio-economic imbalance of intrastate development;

* Physical geography.

The greater the synergistic effect from the imposition of these socio-political and structural risks is achieved, the stronger the potential for “hybrid war” will become: each overlapping risk greatly enhances the cumulative effect of the campaign and “restrains the power of the target state.”

Preparation stage:

“Hybrid wars” are always preceded by a period of social and structural preparation. Social preparation operates in the information space using aspects of soft power to maximize the population’s acceptance of the upcoming destabilization and convince them that certain steps (or passive contemplation of such) are necessary to change the current state of affairs. Structural preparation involves resorting to various techniques that push the governments of target states to actions that unintentionally, but aggravate the already existing socio-political aggravations in society; the challenge is to create “cracks” in the holistic nature of identity that will make it more susceptible to the impact of the social preparation of “hybrid war” and to the subsequent impact of political organizations backed by non-profit organizations (NPOs); in most cases, such organizations are associated with the Soros Foundation and/or the National Endowment for Democracy. The most common tool used in structural training (and recognized throughout the world) are sanctions, the hidden purpose of which has always been (although not always implemented in practice) to “deteriorate the lives of average citizens” so that they increasingly advocate a change in the ruling regime and, thus, they became susceptible to impulses and messages sent from outside.

However, an even more secret, although now widely used, method for achieving the above goal is the influence of the United States on certain functions of the target state's budget, in particular on the size of its revenue part, and on what exactly these funds are spent. The collapse in global energy and commodity prices has hit exporting countries hard, with many disproportionately dependent on sales of commodities and commodities to meet budget plans. Therefore, a reduction in income always leads to a reduction in government spending on social needs. At the same time, some countries are faced with security threats provoked by the United States and are forced to respond to them hastily; in turn, this leads to unplanned government spending and cuts in funding for social programs. Each of the methods described above is aimed at forcing the target state to reduce government spending on social needs in order to prepare the ground for a possible “color revolution” in the medium term - the first stage of the “hybrid war”. In a situation where the target state is faced with a decrease in budget revenues and a sudden need to increase defense spending, there is a threat of cuts in funding for social programs, which could bring the implementation of the “color revolution” scenario closer from the medium term to the short term (depending on the scale of the outbreak of the internal crisis and the successes that US-influenced and controlled NGOs have achieved in relation to the political organization of previously identified anti-government forces).

Andrew Korybko - American political commentator, currently working for a news agency Sputnik. She is a graduate student at MGIMO and is the author of the monograph “Hybrid Wars: An Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change”
(Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach To Regime Change), published in 2015. The presented material will be included in his new book on the theory of “waging hybrid forms of war.”

Prepared publication and commentaryMikhail Bakalinsky, candidate of philological sciences, doctor of philosophy, independent international observer

Since the end of the Second World War, humanity has not left the fear of the outbreak of the Third World War. This fear was especially reinforced by the now classic statement of Albert Einstein: “I do not know with what weapons the Third World War will be fought, but the Fourth will be fought with stones!” In the West, the concept of “World War III” first became a stratagem, and later turned into a mythology. Russian President Vladimir Putin also spoke about the threat of the Third World War in his second “historical speech”, which, with the light hand of the journalistic and political science community, was called the “Valdai Speech”: a change in the world order (and phenomena of precisely this magnitude we are seeing today), as a rule , was accompanied, if not by a global war, not by global clashes, then by a chain of intense conflicts of a local nature. However, 70 years after the end of World War II and despite dramatic technological and conceptual changes in human society, public perception of the global conflict has undergone virtually no change. They are trying to explain this by the scale of the tragedy of the Second World War, but this interpretation is rather of an everyday nature and appeals to the FEAR archetype. Another interpretation of this perception of the Third World War comes from the crisis of postmodernism as a modern philosophy, expressed in the absence of a vector for the further development of humanity after the end of the Cold War (Francis Fukuyama’s well-known thesis about the “end of history”) and the elimination of all existing political formats (the need to create the so-called fourth political theory). For our part, we propose to supplement the above interpretation of the “stereotypical” perception of the Third World War with a hypothesis about a superficial understanding of political processes.

The linear nature of the perception of reality is a direct continuation of the thesis about the “end of history”: modern strategists cannot come up with anything new, which means that answers must be sought in the past. This statement is not devoid of logic (the new is the old well forgotten), but it misses one detail: although the development process is progressively repeatable in nature (as the third law of dialectics says), it does not mean the identical nature of the repeated event. In other words, the general situation is repeated, but not its details, which ultimately predetermine the outcome of the entire event. In practice, such an attitude often leads to cognitive dissonance, which can result in political apathy, which, using modern political technologies, can be used as part of an information war or, even more dangerous, to prepare a “color revolution.” Another reason for the linear nature of the perception of reality is a superficial understanding of politics: the audience perceives politics through the verbal interventions of politicians or representatives of journalistic and political science circles, while forgetting the well-known axiom: “Politics is the most concentrated expression of economics.” This state of affairs is largely due to the fact that modern humanity is influenced by the media, both conventional and social. Receiving huge volumes of information from numerous sources every day, the target audience loses sight of an extremely important point: the task of any media is to force the audience to accept the information received and, most importantly, the accompanying commentary as the only correct understanding of what is happening. As a result, the linear nature of the perception of reality, a superficial understanding of politics, combined with the aggressive nature of the activities of all types of media, can lead to the fact that the popular American TV presenter Lee Camp ( LeeCamp) called the loss of the ability to think by a modern person brought up in a consumer society.

And yet, society should not be blamed for everything: it is in many ways a hostage to its “guides in the world of information” - numerous experts called upon to comprehensively and objectively comment on what is happening and outline prospects. The author’s own observations of these lines, who do not claim to be the ultimate truth, have shown that it is journalistic and political science circles that, in their assessments, systematically miss the economic component of all (geo)political conflicts or touch on it superficially or give somewhat dubious economic comments. Another “sin” of the “expert community” is the exaggeration of a geopolitical rival: endowing it with capabilities that in reality it does not have (the clearly protracted political crisis in Brazil shows that). So, for example, Andrew Korybko (with whom the author of these lines had the honor and pleasure of communicating on professional topics), on the one hand, made an attempt to destroy the linear nature of the perception of the “Third World War” stratagem (which he succeeded), offering readers a truly new vision mechanism of the “world shake-up”, different from the usual models based on stereotypes and phobias, but on the other hand, it still “sins” with linear thinking and ignoring economic realities. Andrew Korybko clearly exaggerated US capabilities when he described a scenario called the “Brzezinski Pivot” - a simultaneous attack on Russia from Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, speaking about the “Caucasian direction of attack,” Andrew Korybko means the unfreezing of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: it seems to us that the author probably proceeded from an understanding of the strong economic dependence of Azerbaijan on the collective West: up to 90% of the republic’s total exports, and with it, the main source of replenishment of the local budget is formed by oil and its products; 82% of the income received in this area comes from one legal entity - BP-Azerbaijan. Baku experts call such enslaving conditions for sharing profits unprecedented in world economic practice. However, at the same time, Andrew Korybko lost sight of the fact, and this may indicate that Washington does not fully control the political leadership of Azerbaijan. Also, recently, Azerbaijan has increasingly demonstrated a drift towards Iran and, what is extremely important, is establishing cooperative ties with Russia not only in the oil and gas sector, but also in the infrastructure and manufacturing sectors. In addition, carrying out such a large-scale operation as the “Brzezinski U-Turn” must be based on a powerful economy, and the situation in the US economy is far from rosy, as mentioned. Thus, we have before us an example of a political commentator ignoring economic events and, as a result, linear thinking of a unipolar world, although Andrew Korybko himself stands for a multipolar model of the world order.

In conclusion, I would like to remind you that the cognitive activity of modern man in the conditions of a global information war, as well as a “hybrid” war, should be based on the Greek criterion of truth (“there is no criterion of truth”) and, as a result, be guided by the Hegelian principle of dialectics “thesis- antithesis-synthesis." Only in this case can one achieve an adequate and comprehensive understanding of the ongoing processes and be able to build scenarios for the further development of the situation.

Related materials

We reviewed the basics of the theory of hybrid warfare and described 7 principles of its conduct. This lesson will be devoted to continuing the study of the theory of hybrid warfare. The last lesson, but not the final one. Hybrid War- this is by no means an invention of the ruling regime of modern neo-Soviet Muscovy. Hybrid tactics in ancient Rome were used by criminal gangs, regular soldiers and irregular fighters against Vespasian's Roman legions during the Jewish revolt in 66 BC.

An example of the use of hybrid force is also the Soviet partisan movement during the Second World War. To understand what hybrid warfare means requires an in-depth study of the reasons that form hybrid power and at the same time in which it is formed. Logically speaking, a hybrid force is formed to produce specific battlefield effects directly on the enemy combatant.

The formation of this force would be limited by both the available means (in the disposal of these combatants) and the available ways in which these means could be applied to achieve the desired goals.
For hybrid force, this formation process is different from conventional and irregular warfare. In this, the constraints and motivations that drive hybrid power make hybrid warfare itself, both with a unique logic and explained in the principles of the theories.

Hybrid warfare, as a military term, was first introduced in 2007 in the United States. In its original interpretation, the term was described as the convergence of regular and irregular threats using simple and complex military technology through decentralized planning and execution. Let's just take a break for a few seconds.

Imagine the level of strategic thought of the subjects of US strategy when they initially used the term “hybrid war” in their own country.
For, there was no such concept and term as “decentralized planning and execution” either in the Russian imperial army, or in the Soviet army, or in the Russian army. Decentralized planning is planning carried out at the platoon level.

Hybrid warfare, definition.

In 2007, the term "hybrid threat", as an original idea, was explored in more detail. That is, hybrid warfare began to be interpreted as a fusion of many energies, from conventional and unconventional forces, in conjunction with terrorism and criminal behavior. This fusion is oriented toward a desired common goal through political guidelines that simultaneously and adaptively unify all elements of power.

State and non-state actors, at the tactical, operational or strategic level, can conduct this form of warfare. By and large, even this initial definition of the concept of “hybrid war” comprehensively describes the method of military operations that the modern state regime of Muscovy unleashed in eastern Ukraine.

At the same time, British military theorists do not consider the different logic regarding the formation and use of the hybrid threat. According to them, hybrid warfare can be carried out by irregular forces that have access to more advanced weapons and systems usually fielded by regular forces. We can also observe this version of the definition in the example of eastern Ukraine. Hybrid warfare can adapt from an ongoing individual campaign and evolve into a large-scale war if circumstances and resources allow it.

As confirmation of these words, one can recall the ideological slogans of the Muscovites, aimed at fighting a certain fascism. And also nonsense in the form of the destroyer "Adolf Hitler" of the Right Sector, which fired at Donbass. Israeli military theorists describe hybrid threat and hybrid warfare as a method of social warfare that is not limited by social restrictions.

Therefore, a hybrid threat not only gains physical advantage through a combination of conventional technologies and organizations with unconventional tactics. But it also gains a cognitive advantage from the very lack of social constraints. For the ordinary forces of the State must adhere to the laws and customs of war governed by the Geneva Conventions.

Added to this dual advantage is the idea that hybrid forces operate as a networked system that is not much faster than conventional force since it relies on popular opinion, its support base, and internal feedback loops.

The non-state nature of hybrid warfare.

This is exactly what was said in the previous lesson, expressed in different words. These are the first and second principles of hybrid warfare. That is, the composition of a hybrid force, its capabilities and effects are unique to the force's own specific context. And also that there is a specific ideology within the hybrid force that creates internal tension in the organization. Since 2008, the theory of hybrid warfare in the United States has been refined.

Hybrid power actors were found to attempt to integrate the internal tactical effects of success and information technology on failure through the deliberate exploitation of cognitive and moral domains. The hybrid force is thus able to compress the levels of war, and thus accelerate the pace at both the tactical and strategic levels in a manner faster than a more conventional participant is able to carry out the same process.

In this theoretical model, a hybrid participant will always gain a perceived strategic advantage over a conventional participant, regardless of tactical outcomes. To reiterate: A hybrid force is a military organization that uses a combination of conventional and unconventional organizations, equipment and techniques in a unique operating environment designed to achieve greater strategic effects. Thus, in a hybrid war, the hybrid force extends its ideological influence across geographic boundaries to those regions where the central government and security institutions are weak to resist infiltration.

That is, this happens where there is a high level of state corruption. The degree of corruption of a particular state is determined through the formula:

Degree of corruption=Monopolies+Degree of decision-making in society - Accountability and transparency of the state apparatus - Morality.

In 2009, the theory of hybrid warfare was analyzed even more deeply. Hybrid warfare began to be interpreted as a basic unity of cognitive and material approaches in the production of effects.

This unity of cognitive and material domains allows for flexibility in a strategic context in which “social rules” can be revised in an iterative process to the advantage of the hybrid in terms of legality and military norms. The resulting flexibility facilitates adaptation, which allows the hybrid force to quickly take advantage of opportunities both in terms of material equipment and in terms of cognitive influence on the environment. This is the only definition that is not suitable for explaining the processes taking place in the east of Ukraine due to the lack of strategists as such in the regime of modern Muscovy.

As a result, since 2010, a hybrid threat has been defined as a dynamic combination of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal organizations and capabilities adapting to counter traditional advantages, as we have seen in events in eastern Ukraine since March 2014. Moreover, these forces may cooperate in the context of pursuing their own organizational common goals.

Hybrid threats can exploit media technologies and their positions within political military and social infrastructures. Hybrid threats adapt creatively by combining advanced weapons, command and control, cyber activities, and combined weapons tactics to engage conventional forces when conditions are favorable. I emphasize: in 2010 the word “can be used” was used, and since 2010 the Muscovite hybrid force has acted exactly like this.

Hybrid war, generalization of concepts.

After reviewing available military theories and the various forms of hybrid warfare, it is appropriate to return to one of the world's most respected military theorists of war, Carl von Clausewitz. To look at the theory of hybrid war a little more broadly. Clausewitz defined war as the act of using force to force our enemy to fulfill our desires. Or impose complete lack of will, which is what the modern Muscovite regime of Putin is trying to achieve. Clausewitz theorized that the ultimate expression of war—ideal war or absolute war—occurs where all available resources and assets are applied to achieve the desired end state of war.

However, Clausewitz pointed out that this ultimate expression of war would often be in conflict with the desired political goals of the war. He thus outlined the concept of limited war, during which military forces optimize available means to suit limited political objectives. As a result of the generalization of the concept of ideal or total war, limited war and military operations that occur below the level of declared war have become accepted generalizations about war in general.

This idea of ​​limited war, with its inherent ideas of social limitation and thresholds of military potential, has a very modern meaning in the design and employment of military organizations. In times of war, the state actor will act according to available and determined means, a portion of the gross domestic product. Generating GDP to technological capabilities as well as to the projected contingency needs of a political target state planned against potential adversaries in a variety of contexts. Something that has never happened in Russia in general and in principle throughout history.

As a result, a typical military organization will be optimized for a wide range of potential scenarios based on likely political nature. In most resource-rich countries such as the US and China, this results in a broad force that prepares for offense, defense and operations through actions on a variable scale. Optimization is not just about cutting down. Optimization is bringing to certain capabilities. And the modern army of Muscovy has been optimized to the point that it began to operate using the same methods. as well as the Hezbollah group.

In reality, this optimized force is not prepared for a specific context, but rather is optimized to best perform a wide range of scenarios for the resulting employment in fewer optimizations for a unique context. However, not all military organizations develop in this way. Countries with limited resources or technological capabilities must decide on the breadth and depth of these optimizations.

This practice can then lead to many variations of military organizations from broad and flat armies, primarily light infantry intended for specific functions such as population control and internal regime survival, to small or medium-sized forces with depth of combined weaponry. To counter specific external threats, such as enemy tanks, missiles or aircraft. In general, these less resourced organizations will correspond to the usual model of multiple full-spectrum armed forces, such as the USSR Army.

But on a smaller scale, such as the Egyptian army of the 1973 period, based on the Soviet type of organizational model. In some cases, organizations will develop optimized structures outside of conventional models. These unconventional structures will be optimized for a specific contextual purpose, using resources and capabilities not contained in conventional military force. An example of this is the so-called Donbass militia.

Observers often refer to these unconventional organizations as asymmetric or hybrid threats that offer certain advantages to automatically change the battlefield calculus when composing a more conventional force. These observers then often refer to the resulting conflict as a hybrid war. In other words, hybrid warfare can best be described as an optimized form of warfare that allows a belligerent to attempt to use all available resources, both conventional and unconventional, in a unique cultural context to exert a specific impact against a conventional enemy, which has been the case in eastern Ukraine since 2014 and observed.

War seems to us to be a confrontation between two forces that are on opposite sides of the front, but in our time war takes other forms.

No less destructive can be a hybrid war, the goal of which is total control not only over the opposing side, but also over allies. It may be carried out quietly, but the consequences will be no less terrible.

Features of hybrid warfare

The importance of indirect and asymmetrical actions is increasing.

Hidden force measures are used.

The protest potential of the population is used

What is hybrid warfare. Expert Dmitry Gusev speaks

Secret subversive actions, rebellions, and separatist uprisings are possible, in which state governance structures are attacked. Military actions can be supported by internal structures (nationalist organizations, pseudo-religious groups, organized crime, oligarchs).

Stages of implementing a hybrid war

1. Military actions: creation of illegal armed groups, provoking conflicts of various types in the target country, seizure of government buildings and important infrastructure, introduction of regular armed forces under the guise of local armed groups, discrediting the actions of the existing leadership.

2. Information war: influence on the population of the target country, introduction of the necessary information among citizens of the aggressor country, tactical information support in the international community.

3. Energy influence: seizure or destruction of the energy infrastructure of the target country, disruption of stability in the operation of the energy system, cessation of energy supplies to ensure the functioning of society.

Hybrid warfare strategy

The main principle of the strategy is to throw all forces at the bottlenecks and vulnerabilities of the target country in order to destabilize the political and military leadership, socio-economic structures and cultural and ideological sphere. All this leads to the breakdown of the state and the transfer of its control to external forces.

Features of the hybrid war strategy:

An important role is given to information, diplomatic, cyber and economic methods;

The shortest possible time frame for eliminating the previous government and taking control of the aggressor country;

The absence of a clearly defined external aggressor, which makes it possible to wage war with formal compliance with legal norms.

How to counter hybrid warfare technologies?

Develop a state concept to counter hybrid warfare.

Prepare personnel capable of effective confrontation.

Control of civilian security forces.

Develop indicators that help quickly determine the extent of the threat. Timely identification of vulnerabilities.

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Internet program "Finding Meaning"
Topic: "Hybrid War"
Issue #134

Stepan Sulakshin: Good afternoon friends! Today’s term, as we agreed, is “hybrid war.” We will analyze its very phenomenon and content, and this term is also interesting from a methodological point of view, because if we remove the predicator, the determinant, then it simply means war.

Everyone, of course, knows what war is, there is no need to explain anything here, but adding a description, characteristics, the word “hybrid” gives rise to some new synthetic term, and you need to deal with it. Because I think it’s very difficult for us to immediately look inside ourselves and say exactly and definitely what is meant by this term. That is why this term is very relevant. So, Vardan Ernestovich Bagdasaryan begins.

Vardan Baghdasaryan: I’ll start with a quote from a Russian classic: “ If there is a whistling and uproar about Russia's lust for power and conquest, know that one of the Western European powers is preparing a shameless seizure of someone else's land " This was said by Ivan Sergeevich Aksakov in 1876 in connection with events in Serbia.

At that time, Russia had not yet intervened in the war, Russian troops had not yet been sent, but it supported the rebels - Serbs, Bulgarians, against whom the Turkish massacre was carried out with the approval of the West.

It is clear that today this concept of “hybrid war” is used against Russia. It is clear that this concept was introduced in order to say that Russia is an aggressor and that it is waging a war. But Western countries act in exactly the same way. Both the Americans and the British do not seem to be participating in the war, but there are instructors there, there are so-called private armies, and so on. It seems that they are not a belligerent party, but they take part in the war.

A certain matrix appears. In the post-Soviet period, we imitate the West in everything, but the old Russian formula on which the Russian political position was built is forgotten: “God is not in power, but in truth.” If you play chess with the devil, you will still lose, because you play by his rules, so it is more correct to play from the position of truth.

If there is aggression, and this aggression comes from the West, then Russia’s participation is direct. War means war, and there are no halftones here when we seem to have nothing to do with it, but with the other hand we provide support. This position is vulnerable, and the concept of “hybrid war”, which has developed in the West, hits Russia directly.

What is a hybrid? A hybrid is a new product that arises as a result of crossing varieties of this product. A hybrid war seems to be not a war, but at the same time a war. In general, such intersecting concepts are characteristic of postmodernity.

The concepts of “hybrid” and “hybrid form” were used in relation to political organizations – “hybrid political organizations”. It seems that organizations are not political, but at the same time they carry out political functions.

In particular, the literature refers to the fan organizations of the Milan football club, which were founded by Berlusconi. It seems that these are Milan fans, but in fact they provided political support, solved the political problems that Milan President Berlusconi set for them.

We, when there was no concept of “hybrid war,” had the same format; the perestroika opposition movement began as an environmental movement. It would seem that this movement was environmental, but at the same time it was not environmental, but political, and it played an important political role, including in destabilizing the social situation in the USSR.

The development of this concept – “hybrid war”, is a very characteristic indicator. Initially, when it was just introduced into circulation, it was not applied to the Russian context and the content was completely different. When this concept was used, it was interpreted as a combination of war in its classical sense, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, cyber warfare, in general, completely different components. They referred, in particular, to Hezbollah’s actions in the Lebanese war and other regional wars. Here there was no active participation in the war, but rebels, elements of guerrilla warfare, and so on were used.

By and large, although they are trying to present this phenomenon as something fundamentally new, such elements can also be found in history. For example, the concept of “Scythian war” also falls under this definition, but a change in discourse is indicative here.

When the situation of 2014 arises - Russia’s participation in the events in Donbass, the paradigm for interpreting hybrid war changes. Here, a hybrid war is no longer a mixture of various tactics, it is actually a war without a direct declaration of war, without direct participation. The discourse has changed, and this discourse is used specifically against the Russian position.

Further more. In media publications, the concept of “hybrid warfare” is used more and more often. Several publications have appeared that Russia is not only waging a hybrid war in Ukraine, it is waging a hybrid war globally. According to publications in “Russia Today”, Russia is a global aggressor because it uses cyber techniques, means of propaganda, and so on, and Russia turns into such an aggressor, and not just a regional aggressor, but a planetary aggressor.

In the latest National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the topic of Russian aggression sounds like a threat to the whole world, and not just to Ukraine, as a global threat, and it is emphasized. Thus, the concept of “hybrid warfare” can be classified as a cognitive weapon, it is thus used, and as such a cognitive weapon it should be perceived, and the response to it should be organized accordingly.

Stepan Sulakshin: Thank you, Vardan Ernestovich. Vladimir Nikolaevich Leksin.

Vladimir Leksin: The phrase “hybrid war,” on the one hand, is understandable, that is, it is something mixed - military, non-military actions, and so on, on the other hand, it is a holistic thing. The concept of the integrity of what is called a hybrid war is increasingly taking over the minds of military personnel, analysts, political scientists, but first of all, of course, the military.

Military strategy, as we were once taught, includes several types of wars: conventional wars, small wars, regional wars, but these are all wars when the armed forces of one side act against the armed forces of the other side.

In these wars, nuclear, biological, chemical, and also various unconventional types of weapons are used, but still in conventional, classical wars, the main ones are conventional types of weapons or, as the Americans now call them, “lethal weapons.” Lethal weapons primarily lead to the death of military personnel, the military forces of the state with which the war is being waged.

There is also the concept of “symmetrical warfare”. This is a war between armed forces pursuing an aggressive policy and various potential participants in this war, who then become real participants. The classic example is the Afghan wars, the one in which the Soviet Union participated, and the one that is still being fought in Afghanistan.

What do they think about hybrid wars abroad and here? There are official documents, for example, the “white paper” of the US Army Special Operations Command. It is freely available and can be found on the Internet, and it is called “Countering Unconventional Warfare.” It has a separate concept called “Winning in a Complex World.”

I will briefly outline the essence of the two-page definition on this matter. This is war, real military action, which involves mainly undeclared, secret, but nevertheless typical military actions, during which the belligerent attack the state structures and/or the regular army of the enemy with the help of local rebels and separatists, supported by weapons and finances from abroad and some internal structures: oligarchs, organized crime, nationalist, pseudo-religious organizations.

The same US and NATO documents that I have already mentioned indicate that, given the fundamental role of the armed forces, for successful confrontation in hybrid wars, most often at the middle or final stage of waging this kind of war, one should combine the efforts of one’s governments, army, and intelligence services under the auspices of the United States in this case as part of, I quote, “a comprehensive interdepartmental, intergovernmental and international strategy.”

That is, we are also talking about the fact that not only those two countries that are clearly in conflict are simultaneously involved in hybrid wars, but also the forces of other countries. What are the actions of these external forces? I quote: “Actions consist of assisting the rebels and recruiting supporters, their training, operational and logistical support, influencing the economy and social sphere, coordinating diplomatic efforts, as well as conducting individual security operations.” All this, without any exception, is happening now on the territory of Ukraine.

In conducting hybrid wars, a significant role is played by what is called “public diplomacy.” It is understood as forces capable of exerting the necessary influence on the parties to the conflict in order to give events the desired direction. Suffice it to recall the Maidan, how its vector changed depending on how external forces applied their specific efforts to it. At the same time, counteraction to enemy information attacks is organized.

In hybrid wars, intelligence plays a much larger role than in typical or classic wars, when “army against army,” because here you need to know well what is happening on the territory of a potential enemy. You need to know all its internal capabilities, and most importantly, you need to know the layout of social forces in this country: opposition, pseudo-opposition structures, as well as structures that can stir up the masses when needed.

Two quotes. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General of the Army Gerasimov, at the military-scientific conference of the Academy of Military Sciences in January 2014, said: “The role of non-military methods of achieving political strategic goals has increased, which in some cases, in their effectiveness, I emphasize, significantly exceeds military means. They are complemented by covert military measures, including information warfare activities, the actions of special operations forces, and the use of the protest potential of the population.”

I repeat once again, this is a speech by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. According to authoritative experts, military and political observers, everything that has just been said is extremely important for Russia. There is a specific proposal that, under existing conditions, the concept of “hybrid war” must be included precisely in the context that we just talked about, in what is called the doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation.

A hybrid war is not a phantom, it is not a fantasy, it is a reality that has long had its own clear contours, its own ideas about the balance of power and, most importantly, about its effectiveness. Let me emphasize once again, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation believes that the means used in hybrid warfare are superior to military means, before the military comes into action, if they come into action at all. Thank you for attention.

Stepan Sulakshin: Thank you, Vladimir Nikolaevich. The concept of classical war is formed in our routine consciousness by patriotic historical education and upbringing. What is it? There is a front line, on one side it is ours, on the other it is not ours. We invade, we conquer lands, and this becomes a thing of the past.

But in reality, new forms of war are coming as armed confrontation between states. These three key words - armed confrontation between states - will be necessary here. Many new types of armed confrontation between states are emerging, this is a consequence of technical and technological development, offensive and defensive weapons, technologies, and technologies of confrontation.

In this regard, weapons no longer only represent means of physical destruction, when a bullet flies and hits a soldier’s body, and a shell explodes material objects, here the means and purposes of destruction change somewhat.

For example, the mass consciousness of the population changes, the expert consciousness of government decision makers, right down to deputies, congressmen, ministers, and presidents of the country, when they are instilled with certain theories, certain value positions, and they motivate people to take certain actions. And this is also a state confrontation.

This confrontation is armed because it is achieved by special technologies, special information, including technical devices, global network information distributed devices, and so on.

Therefore, when the phrase “hybrid war” arose quite recently, it had this whole background behind it - the improvement of the means and types of armed confrontation between states. This term reflects the real achievements and realities of the use of means of struggle in the modern political world, the world of confrontation between states.

I want to give a definition that we will continue to sharpen and polish in the future interdisciplinary dictionary. So, “a hybrid war is a type of military confrontation between states that involves in armed actions, in addition to the regular army or instead of the regular army, special services and special missions, mercenary forces, guerrilla forces, mass protest riots, terrorist attacks, and the goal of a hybrid war may be not occupation, but a change of political regime or state policy in the attacked country.”

The last part of this definition means that the classic goals of war - the seizure of material resources, which once were slaves, territories, natural resources, treasuries, wealth, gold, are not a thing of the past. The goals of the aggressive aggressive armed struggle of states have changed their form of existence, and they are achieved differently. It is enough to make the political regime of the enemy country puppet, desovereignized, subordinate to the country aggressively attacking, and it will make decisions in favor of the victorious country.

But Russia’s position in this balance is unenviable, the consumerism coefficient is significantly less than one. We produce and contribute to the global consumer balance more than we consume domestically. Here's the result. There was no “hot” war with Russia, but the goals were achieved, the goals that Hitler had set. Hitler failed to achieve them, but the West succeeded.

Therefore, there is a generic, nuclear, semantic similarity between a hybrid war and a conventional war. Their goals are the same - obtaining benefits through and as a result of victory over the enemy state.

The West knows very well how hybrid wars are done, and the term itself came from there. Hybrid wars were tested in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine. According to the political world and the West, Russia today is waging a hybrid war against Ukraine. A lot of objective signs that fit into our definition confirm that Russia is not alien to modern methods of state warfare.

A similar war was waged by the West 30 years ago in Afghanistan during the presence of the Soviet Union contingent there. It is quite obvious that such a war is being prepared against Russia. Understanding the content of this term, this category, we see these preparatory works. We see testing, training, accumulation of resources, growing infrastructure within our country. A soft and related form of hybrid war is the already well-known “color” revolution.

Thus, it turns out that hybrid war is a modern evolutionary form of war as such. The newest forms of war include a number of wars: information war, network war, cognitive war, cyber war, distant war in Yugoslavia, the war in the first phase in Iraq. And then a hybrid war appeared.

But, my friends, what is amazing? We take and read the very latest, 2014, documents: “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation”, “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, “Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation”. You will be amazed, but none of these documents contain the concept of “hybrid war”; they do not contain the concept of information warfare, network warfare, cognitive warfare, distant warfare, cyber warfare. There is not a single concept of modern wars there.

Well, what can I say? All that remains is to throw up your hands. Therefore, it seems to us that our attempt not only to organize our brains, but also to introduce into the discourse an understanding of the latest accurate semantic interpretations, including about things that threaten our country, is a very important matter.

Thank you. Next time we come to find the meaning of the term “political responsibility”. This will be interesting, because responsibility is also not a simple thing, but somewhat multi-sense. All the best. See you.

Hybrid war against Russia - this term appeared in the everyday life of citizens of our country a decade ago. It has been known to professionals since the 90s. Western media call the events taking place on the world stage nothing less than Putin’s hybrid war against Ukraine. Is this really true?

What is the essence of hybrid warfare?

The natural outcome of confrontation between states (blocs, coalitions) is victory. Modern technologies have made it possible to inflict defeat without millions of casualties on the battlefield. The participation of the armed forces is part of the overall strategy:

1. Undermine the state's economy. Methods: sanctions, embargo, maneuvering on world prices of strategic raw materials and currencies;
2. Reduce the morale of the population and the armed forces. Methods: collapse of the domestic and foreign markets, initiation of a surge in inflation, rising unemployment, terrorist attacks, intimidating events, and so on;
3. Blocking the opinion of the world community through the media. Monopolization of international information resources, provision of distorted data, deliberate suppression of facts, simulation of non-existent events;
4. Depletion of financial resources, collapse of the state budget. The method is being drawn into a military conflict, entailing material costs;
5. Undermining trust in the current government. Manipulation of public consciousness, support for radical opposition, initiation of riots, “color revolutions”, protests;
6. Other economic, informational, sociological and political components.

What is NATO hybrid warfare on the battlefield?

NATO hybrid warfare has brought changes to the classical understanding of military operations. Tactics are taking on new forms, the distinctive features of which are:

• hostilities take place on the territory of other states that are not direct participants in the confrontation;
• in a civil war, units formed from civilians (volunteer units, extremist armed formations, human shields of non-military personnel, etc.) participate;
• supervision of combat operations by NATO consultants;
• provision of weapons, supplies, uniforms, ammunition, equipment.

Theory of conducting hybrid wars between the USA and NATO at the domestic political level

It is possible to gain control over a state that serves as a springboard for further actions if you neutralize the current government, which is loyal to the enemy state. In return, we need to install a government that will unquestioningly carry out orders even to the detriment of its own country.

This means that the hybrid war strategy allows:

• impeachment of the president;
• armed coup;
• overthrow of power by uprising;
• liquidation of the first leader of the country and persons occupying key positions;
• recruitment of opposition leaders;
• bribery of parliamentarians and deputies;
• material support for radical forces;
• other violent and non-violent ways to remove the president and government from office.

Hybrid war is a conspiracy between states against one country. This fact means that the participants are not only the United States, but also everyone included in the NATO bloc.

Foreign policy side of the hybrid war against Russia

The reasons for Ukrainian destabilization lie in the reluctance of V.F. Yanukovych to become part of the alliance. Awareness of the benefits of cooperation with Russia, understanding of the importance of strategic partnership, desire to repay loans to the International Monetary Fund. These factors served as a catalyst for the outbreak of the conflict.

This does not mean that the war might not have happened. The behavior of the United States and Western partners indicated that global confrontation was inevitable. It started in the last decades of the twentieth century. The hybrid war on the territory of Ukraine is the next round.

Place of battles in hybrid wars

The definition of mixed war (hybrid) does not imply a specific territorial characteristic. The modern world economy presupposes close ties between states that do not border each other. Location on different continents is also not decisive.

The place of action can be any state within the orbit of interests of the Russian Federation. By causing a revolutionary conflict, a coup, a civil war, or sponsoring a terrorist group, the United States can force the Russian Federation to participate in solving the problem. This fact means material costs, the ability to present what is happening as an invasion, seizure, establishment of a regime or annexation.

Modern technologies involve conducting hybrid wars in cyber space. Blocking Internet information sources, attacks on control and management systems of strategic military and civilian facilities. Restrictions on the exchange of technologies and developments. These factors are levers of pressure directed against Russia.

World exchanges. Here the battles are just as fierce. Declining prices for strategic raw materials provokes a fall in the national currency. We will not list all the ways to influence the state’s economy. Suffice it to note that the defense capability of countries directly depends on the world market (raw materials, foreign exchange, production).

Signing agreements on interstate cooperation, persuading states to their side with promises, loans, deception, bribery of key officials - methods of reducing the influence of the enemy on the world stage and ways of initiating the decline of the domestic economy.

The place where hybrid wars are fought is the entire globe and near-Earth space (the battle for supremacy within the orbit). The sphere of influence is any activity of human civilization. At the moment, the Russian Federation is taking the blow and is able to respond to it without violating international ethical standards.

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